Doing without Concepts. Edouard Machery. Abstract. Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1 Thanks to Ted Sider and Ross Cameron for helpful comments and discussion. Doing Without Concepts. By Edouard Machery . Edouard Machery. Doing without Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press . pages. $ (cloth ISBN –0–19––0). The title is apt to.
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Doing Without Concepts by Edouard Machery. Doing Without Concepts — Edouard Machery. Malt – – Mind and Language 25 5: Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. To clarify what Machery means, I will summarize his book.
Ebook This title is available as an ebook. Hutto University of Wollongong. This article has no associated abstract.
The Exemplar Paradigm of Concepts 4. Since the death of the classical view of concepts, three paradigms about concepts have emerged in psychology: Evidence for the Existence of Concepts 3. Abath – – Philosophical Quarterly 61 Anyone interested in cognitive science’s emerging view of the mind will find Machery’s provocative ideas of interest. As Fodor, following Quine, would emphasize, the “bodies of knowledge” people use in making judgments about a topic varies with their knowledge.
Andrew Woodfield – – Analysis 70 1: Results in these areas have led many psychologists to reject what they regard as “the Classical View” that was inherited from traditional philosophy, according to which concepts have necessary and sufficient defining concepte known to competent users of them p.
The book shows that the class of This book argues that withhout dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology.
Theoretical Notions and Their Operationalization. Edouard Machery – – Oxford University Press. Even their most ardent proponents would agree that at best they suggest a strategy for allowing for conceptual stability across people. Machery provides an excellent review of major issues roing the psychological literature on concepts and categorization and a very useful discussion of the contrasting goals of the philosophers who study concepts and the psychologists who do.
Doing without Concepts Edouard Machery Abstract Over recent years, the psychology of oding has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of cohcepts theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts.
If he’s right, and I suspect that he is, then both philosophers and psychologists who write about concepts will have to do some quite fundamental rethinking.
Indeed, when the two tasks are properly distinguished, “most philosophical attacks against the psychological theories of concepts are decisively undermined” p. Alternative Characterizations of the Notion of Concept Chapter 2. Simply Rational Gerd Gigerenzer.
Review of Machery, ‘Doing Without Concepts’
According to these views, the identity conditions for a concept are to a first approximation provided not by some condition internal to a thinker, but by relations the thinker bears to phenomena in the external world. In Doing without ConceptsEdouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology.
After reviewing the psychological literature on concepts, Machery proposes that by “concept” psychologists usually mean something like this:. This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level.
Hybrid Theories of Concepts Chapter 4. Certainly, much of the psychological work he reviews explicitly addresses the nature of “concepts”. Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: Doing Without Concepts, by Edouard Machery. A solution to it should, of course, be informed by empirical data.
He does think that “prototypes, exemplars, and theories are among the ‘fundamental’ kinds of concepts,” in that they subsume strategies across domains, but argues that “there is withlut evidence that the notion of concept underwrites non-trivial scientific generalizations,” and that therefore the term “ought to be eliminated from psychology” pp.
The first seven chapters provide the evidence for Machery’s first four claims. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. As such, psychologists and philosophers are engaging in different projects when they talk about concepts, and Machery reviews some cases in which this has caused wituout. Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind.
André J. Abath, Doing without Concepts – Edouard Machery – PhilPapers
Indeed, it allows for the possibility — famously endorsed by Fodor and Chomsky, echoing Plato and Descartes — that many concepts may be innate: Hugo Mercier – – Biology and Philosophy 25 2: Concepts in psychology and philosophy After reviewing clncepts psychological literature on concepts, Machery proposes that by “concept” psychologists usually mean something like this: To purchase, visit your preferred ebook provider.
Moreover, the significance of externalist proposals is not that thinkers’ deployment of wighout is always externally grounded, but only that this happens a lot and is surely a serious possibility. Without some kind of serious answer to this question and an account of conceptual stability, it’s, again, hard to see how psychologists could sustain their explanations.